

Terrorism or Resistance? A Critical Study of HAMAS's Identity and Strategy

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Abstract

As research on the Palestinian Resistance Movement and its impact on the Middle East has increased, the question of where the boundary lies between "resistance" and "terrorism" remains insufficiently clarified. This study examines Hamas, which sits at the intersection of these two concepts, and deepens the analysis by employing Frantz Fanon's theory of anti-colonial violence. According to Fanon, violence is not merely a strategic method but a necessary condition for survival under colonial domination. This approach demonstrates that Hamas's use of violence is not solely based on ideological reasons but is also shaped by historical, political, and economic pressures. The study argues that Hamas's transformation into a militant organization is the result of multiple, interconnected factors such as prolonged occupation, forced displacement, and severe social deprivation. These harsh conditions necessitate understanding Hamas's actions beyond definitions of terrorism, as a legitimate and compelled form of resistance. Furthermore, the study clarifies the conceptual boundaries of resistance and comprehensively reveals the social functions and roles of resistance movements. Thus, it emphasizes that Hamas is not merely an armed group but also a deeply rooted social movement that protects Palestinian society, sustains its struggle for existence, and has strong grassroots support under difficult circumstances.

Keywords: Hamas, Resistance, Terrorism, Conflict, Political Violence, Displacement

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1. Introduction

The Israel-Hamas war has long been an inseparable part of the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has deep historical, political, and social roots. The latest wave of clashes, which erupted on October 7, 2023, has not only escalated tensions between the parties but has also evolved into a new and highly complex phase on a global scale, posing a significant threat to international security. The active involvement of various state and non-state actors—most notably the Houthis in Yemen—has both intensified the violence and paved the way for the conflict to extend beyond its regional boundaries, spreading across a wider geography. This war has reignited the Palestinian struggle for liberation, but it has also triggered Israel's harsh and disproportionate response. According to the Gaza Ministry of Health, at least 53,010 Palestinians have been killed and 119,919 injured since October 7, 2023. The Gaza Government Media Office has put the death toll at over 61,700 and reported that thousands more are likely missing under the rubble. A tragedy of this scale has brought to the forefront the urgent need to reexamine the concepts of "terrorism" and "resistance," sparking profound debates over fundamental principles such as legitimacy, justice, and international moral responsibility.

Academic interest in the phenomenon of resistance has been steadily increasing across a wide range of disciplines, including sociology, anthropology, cultural studies, geography, political science, and gender studies, gaining a growing degree of interdisciplinary conceptual depth (Hollander and Einwohner, 2004). Questions such as “Is resistance inherently negative?” or “Does resistance fuel terrorism?” not only interrogate the meaning of the concept but also challenge its boundaries of legitimacy. Through such questions, debates emerge over whether resistance is always destructive, threatening, or unlawful, or whether, in certain contexts, it can be understood as a legitimate and creative expression of the pursuit of social change and justice. Thus, these questions do more than outline a conceptual framework; they offer significant insights into how resistance can be situated at social, political, and ethical levels. In this regard, the question of whether resistance can or should be equated with terrorism, violence, or radical ideologies plays a central role in defining the boundaries and connotations of the concept.

This article therefore aims to reveal that resistance is a multifaceted, flexible, and constantly evolving phenomenon that manifests in diverse forms and through various expressions. Depending on the academic discipline defining it, resistance can span a wide range—from armed guerrilla warfare to symbolic gestures (Lee, 2017). The concept of resistance has been defined in a variety of ways, including efforts to protect interests, refusal to comply or cooperate, actions taken against oppression, or practices of challenging authority (Hollander and Einwohner, 2004). As can be seen, the concept has often been associated with anti-social attitudes, destructive behaviors, reactionary or revolutionary ideologies, sudden and unusual outbursts of violence, and emotional reactions. This study, however, seeks to move beyond such narrow and reductionist approaches by exploring the distinctive features and conceptual boundaries of this social phenomenon through a critical review of existing literature. The article is largely informed by social movement theory and collective action theory. It also aims to understand how resistance may evolve into terrorism, to uncover the strategic dynamics of resistance, and to discuss the benefits of analyzing resistance as a strategic tool. Furthermore, this study aims to offer a novel and thought-provoking contribution to the emerging interdisciplinary field of “resistance studies” within the social sciences.

According to the study, the concept of resistance can be perceived differently depending on the context, both as terrorism and as a legitimate means of social change. Accordingly, Hamas’s resistance strategy is a multilayered structure that includes military, political, and diplomatic dimensions and is constantly evolving and transforming. Can Hamas’s dynamic structure become even more complex through the interventions of regional and global actors? Indeed, previous failed global initiatives—such as the Oslo Accords—have been observed to trigger the continuity of resistance and an escalation of violence. The final and perhaps most important question is: “Although Hamas is linked to Islamist movements by nature, do definitions of terrorism sufficiently reflect the multifaceted nature of this organization?” In this article, the author examines and synthesizes different bodies of literature that refer to the concept of resistance, aiming to clarify both its theoretical meaning and its sociological functionality through the example of Hamas. Within this framework, the article emphasizes that the ongoing and complex conflict between Hamas and Israel is rooted in historical, territorial, and religious dimensions. The failure of past negotiation processes—such as the Oslo Accords—between the Palestinian Authority and Israel, along with Israel’s settler-colonial approach, has not only failed to contribute to securing Palestinian rights but has also deepened prejudice and hostility toward Israel. In this context, the idea that resistance is a continuous and inevitable necessity for reclaiming rights and defending against Israel’s aggressive policies has become deeply entrenched among Palestinians.

This study aims to challenge the conventional, often one-dimensional perceptions of Hamas and to offer a more comprehensive, realistic, and contextually grounded perspective on the concept of terrorism in the Middle East. By focusing on the questions “What is Hamas?” and “What is Hamas not?”, the article underscores the need to assess the organization not solely as a resistance, but also in light of its political and societal impact on the Palestinian context. Accordingly, the study is structured around the following key questions: How does Hamas construct and employ the concept of resistance? What does the organization’s political transformation signify for Hamas itself? Does this transformation indicate an ideological shift, or merely a tactical repositioning? Given its ideology, tactics, and social base, can Hamas be considered an anti-systemic organization? Through these questions, the analysis provides a more balanced and multidimensional assessment of Hamas.

2. Resistance and Terrorism

According to Crenshaw (1995: 9), the choice of concepts not only shapes language but also molds human consciousness, directly influencing our perceptions of the legitimacy of political authorities around us. She argues that language holds the power to shape societal expectations regarding how a particular issue is defined, framed, and resolved. In this context, the role of language in social construction becomes especially evident in the definition of contested concepts such as terrorism. Terrorism is a socially constructed phenomenon that emerges in the public sphere and is perceived differently depending on the context by particular cultural, linguistic, and other social groups. Schmid's (2011) work, which offers a comprehensive framework for understanding the concept of terrorism, highlights this diversity by including an appendix listing 250 different definitions found in academic and political literature.

When examining the historical origins of terrorism, the etymology of the word and its early applications are particularly noteworthy. The Latin term *terror*, *terroris* means "fear" and is derived from the verb *terreo*, which means "to frighten" or "to terrify." The earliest recorded acts of terrorism in history were carried out by Jewish resistance groups in ancient Palestine who opposed Roman rule—namely the Zealots (fanatics) and the Sicarii (dagger-men) (Horsley, 1979; Law, 2024). Following these examples, the medieval period also marked a phase in which terrorist acts became more systematic. In particular, from the late 11th to the 13th century, the radical Islamist sect known as the Assassins (Hashashin), founded by the Iranian Hassan-i Sabbah, carried out systematic and targeted assassinations against Christians, rival Islamic factions, and political figures throughout the Near East (Rothenberger, 2023).

The term "terrorism" in its modern sense was first used in everyday language during the later stages of the French Revolution, specifically in reference to the oppressive period of 1793–1794 under the Jacobin regime led by Maximilien de Robespierre, referred to as the *régime de la terreur* (Reign of Terror). In this context, the term originally referred to violence perpetrated by the state or ruling authorities—that is, state terrorism. Under the Jacobin regime, it especially described the aristocracy's use of violence and the mass execution of perceived enemies of the state by guillotine. Later, the term was adopted by Russian anarchists to describe violence and resistance directed against the state, and it came to be associated with the actions of insurgents rebelling against government authority (Jenkins, 2003).

The possibility of engaging in political negotiations or making concessions with an actor labeled as a "terrorist" is effectively eliminated. Such an actor is not positioned as a legitimate interlocutor, but rather as an illegal and threatening element; accordingly, the response to them is usually asymmetrical and predominantly military in nature. This labeling process functions not merely as a discursive classification but also as an ideological mechanism that sharpens the boundaries between "us" and "the other" (Rothenberger, 2023).

The culture of terror is characterized by an institutionalized mechanism of "collective fear," aimed at keeping the lower strata of society in a constant state of anxiety. In such a system, anyone who opposes the political status quo faces continuous threats of repression, torture, and death (Sluka, 1995). Repression breeds resistance, and repressive cultures tend to produce forms of social resistance; at times, this evolves into a culture in which resistance becomes a way of life (Sluka, 1995). The persistence and pervasiveness of repression foster a strong sense of solidarity and unity among individuals living under such conditions. Within this intense climate of oppression, individual acts of resistance gradually transform into a collective struggle, giving rise to a resilient spirit across all segments of society. As a result, among communities that have experienced violence and injustice, a broader culture of resistance has emerged—one that not only encompasses individual defiance but also seeks social change and solidarity. This culture reflects not only the community's capacity to withstand oppression but also its power to redefine itself and generate societal transformation (Sluka, 1995).

Resistance studies constitute a rapidly developing yet still theoretically immature field within the social sciences. The field encompasses a wide array of concepts and forms of action associated with resistance, which in turn generates conceptual ambiguity and theoretical fragmentation (Hollander and Einwohner, 2004; Baaz et al., 2016). Within the resistance literature, various forms of action linked to goals, intentions, and (class) interests are frequently emphasized. Paul Routledge defines resistance particularly as actions "guided by intent," while Viegas Fernandes characterizes it as counter-hegemonic attitudes, behaviors, and practices aimed at undermining hierarchical distinctions between social categories and challenging dominant powers. According to Fernandes, the ultimate goal of such forms of resistance is the more equitable and just redistribution of power. In their work on the "geographies of resistance," Steve Pile and Michael Keith (1997) describe resistance as an unrelenting stance against power and as people fighting for freedom,

democracy, and humanity. This definition frames resistance within a normatively affirming perspective—that is, it portrays resistance as an inherently positive, moral, and just form of struggle (Baaz et al., 2016).

Resistance is not merely a phenomenon that manifests through explicit political actions, uprisings, or wars; it can also become visible in the fundamental practices, symbols, and meaning systems of everyday life. In this context, resistance may emerge in the form of passive or symbolic opposition that does not involve direct confrontation with dominant cultures or power structures but nonetheless carries a profound political significance. Unlike acts based on violence, such forms of resistance gain legitimacy through social solidarity, identity formation, and the preservation of cultural continuity. This dynamic is clearly observed in the case of Hamas. The organization's activities aimed at preserving identity within educational institutions, the creation of social welfare networks, and the use of religious symbols and narratives in public discourse can be considered forms of resistance that do not involve physical violence yet convey a powerful political message. These practices sustain the collective memory of Palestinian society while reproducing a sense of identity and belonging. Therefore, resistance should not be understood merely as rebellion or armed struggle, but rather as a multilayered social phenomenon shaped around culture, memory, and identity (Nordstrom, 1992).

However, when the potential of resistance combines with a conscious process of organization, it can transition from the symbolic to the political sphere. The historical development of Hamas represents a typical example of this transformation: initially emerging with the aim of promoting social solidarity and protecting identity, the movement gradually evolved into an organized politico-military structure. This process demonstrates that resistance is not static but rather a dynamic phenomenon that transforms according to contextual conditions. Consequently, resistance must be regarded as an unpredictable and multilayered social reality encompassing social, cultural, and political dimensions (Nordstrom, 1992: 7).

At times, resistance may assume a purely disruptive or obstructive character. However, in most cases, like other social practices, it possesses a generative quality; at the very least, while dismantling certain structures, it simultaneously contributes to the creation of new relationships, ideas, products, discourses, and social activities. Resistance expands the range of choices available to individuals and communities; by unsettling the power relations that define identities, actions, and social positions, it opens up possibilities for their reconfiguration (Baaz et al., 2016). The distinction between terror and resistance becomes particularly evident when examined through a moral lens. Resistance is typically driven by the pursuit of legitimate rights such as independence, freedom, and justice on behalf of a community or people. Even when it involves the use of violence, resistance generally seeks to avoid civilian casualties. It is regarded as a morally justifiable form of struggle because it aims to oppose injustice and oppression. Terrorism, on the other hand, lacks a moral foundation, as its primary aim is to instill fear among civilians, targeting innocent individuals and thereby undermining social order and security. The methods employed by terrorism directly threaten noncombatants, making it difficult to attain moral legitimacy; thus, terrorism stands in contradiction to ethical and humanitarian values.

A paradox may arise from this distinction: although resistance is often viewed as a legitimate and morally grounded form of struggle, the boundaries can become blurred in certain situations. When a resistance movement—despite pursuing rightful aims and opposing an oppressive power—employs tactics that result in civilian casualties or harm to innocent people, it begins to drift away from a morally defensible position. In such cases, the legitimacy of resistance comes into conflict with the moral basis of violence. A struggle initiated in the name of freedom and justice may begin to resemble terrorism if the methods used become ethically unacceptable, thereby causing a morally justified cause to paradoxically lose its moral legitimacy. This paradox can lead to a situation in which a movement is perceived both as a legitimate form of resistance and simultaneously as an instance of terrorism, depending on the nature of its actions (Frisch, 2009).

Many groups attempt to strike a balance between strategic and psychological factors, although ultimately one tends to outweigh the other (Chesterton et al., 2024). Decision-makers within militant groups typically navigate between rational choices and psychological influences. The use of violence against civilians by militant groups can have various motivations, and two main theories explain this phenomenon: The instrumental perspective holds that militant groups use violence against civilians as a rational strategic tool to achieve their objectives. Even ideologically extreme violence serves a strategic purpose, as this approach views violence primarily as a means to an end. The psychological/ideological perspective, on the other hand, focuses on internal group dynamics, sacred values, and deeply held beliefs to understand militant behavior. According to this view, acts of violence are not solely aimed at strategic goals; they are

also triggered by the group's shared ideological convictions and intra-group interactions (Chesterton et al., 2024: 31; Mete and Gündoğmuş, 2021).

Although the terms militant group and terrorist organization both refer to entities that tend to use violence to pursue ideological, political, or religious goals, they do not mean the same thing and often carry different connotations depending on the context. Militant groups may use violence, but it is generally directed toward clear ideological or strategic objectives. Additionally, militant groups often engage in political and social activities alongside violent actions. In contrast, terrorist organizations usually do not pursue such social initiatives, as their primary goal is to convey a political, social, or ideological message through the spread of fear. However, these definitions are often shaped by political motivations.

Finally, elections provide unique political opportunities for resistance. In contexts where elections are used to establish political legitimacy, resistance potential emerges (Lee, 2017). Although not all resistance movements arise from economic downturns, certain economic conditions such as income inequality, unemployment, and inflation are strongly correlated with the emergence of resistance movements (Lee, 2017). Nevertheless, this relationship is not always linear. For instance, despite similar economic conditions in the Middle East during the 1980s and 1990s, uprisings only emerged in some countries; similarly, despite comparable economic indicators in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia, major uprisings occurred only in Algeria and Egypt. This exemplifies the complexity of economic factors in driving resistance and shows that resistance cannot be explained solely by economic conditions but must also be examined within a broader context that includes social, cultural, political, and historical factors (Lee, 2017: 48).

3. Historical Roots, Ideology and Rise of Hamas as A Distinctive Structure

HAMAS, abbreviated from the Arabic Movement-ul Mukavemet-ul Islamiyyeye, means "Islamic Resistance Movement" (Alsarhi and Ahmad, 2016: 1-11; Atuonwu et al., 2021). In December 1987, cleric Sheikh Ahmed Yassin founded Hamas in response to the popular uprising known as the intifada, while Sheikh Ahmed Ismail Hasan Yasin, the founder of the movement organized against the Israeli occupation in the Sheikh Radwan region of Gaza, founded Hamas. Yassin previously led al-Mujama' al-Islami (Islamic Centre), an organization that coordinated political activities in Gaza on behalf of the Muslim Brotherhood. In the same year, Izzeddin Al Qassam, the military wing of the organization, was established. Hamas emerged in the Gaza Strip in the early days of the Palestinian uprising in December 1987 and quickly took a leading role in the violent struggle against Israel (Jensen, 2008: 141; Taraki, 1989). The movement, which grew out of the Muslim Brotherhood, first founded in Egypt in 1928 and active in Palestine since the 1940s, believed that Islamic law and principles were necessary to transform Palestinian society into a single center (Schanzer, 2008: 13). When the first intifada broke out at the end of 1987, the Muslim Brotherhood's need to compete with the nationalist groups of the PLO in the fight against Israel spurred the establishment of Hamas (Alsarhi and Ahmad, 2016 Hroub, 2010, Malka, 2005).

Like many other fundamentalist Islamic movements, the Muslim Brotherhood regards jihad as a general duty incumbent upon all Muslims; however, it prioritizes the establishment of "true Islam" across the Muslim world before engaging in violent jihad against Israel. According to this view, military struggle should follow only after religious and social reform has been achieved. In contrast, Hamas reverses these priorities. As a movement centered on national liberation, Hamas argues that jihad must first focus on the liberation of all Palestinian territories. Only after achieving this goal should Muslims turn their attention to restoring "true faith" across the broader Islamic world. This distinction reflects Hamas's emphasis on immediate political struggle over broader religious transformation (Gupta and Mundra, 2005). To achieve this independently, Hamas added a foreign affairs department to its political structure as it gained support during the first Intifada years. When it did so, it felt strong enough to withdraw from the Muslim Brotherhood and become an independent organization (Baconi, 2007: 131). In fact, the ideological consolidation of this movement also reflects the deep traumas experienced behind the Intifadas. The 1948 Arab-Israeli War, which led to the establishment of Israel and the collapse of Palestinian society, is described in Israeli narratives as an unforgettable miracle where a small Jewish David defeated a giant Arab Goliath. On the other hand, for Palestinians, the 1948 war created the Nakba (catastrophe), a collective trauma that displaced more than 750,000 Palestinians and has left a lasting mark on nearly every Palestinian's consciousness. Thus, the collective memory, formed through a sense of historical injustice and dispossession, has generated a legitimate motivation for resistance and a desire to claim fundamental rights.

It is not accurate to place Hamas on the same level as Islamist terrorist organizations, as it possesses several distinct and arguably more positive features. First and foremost, Hamas emerged as a product of resistance. It is not merely a group carrying out armed actions but also a political actor that entered the Palestinian political arena by forming a government after the 2006 elections. With its remarkable victory in the Palestinian Legislative Council elections, Hamas transitioned from being a fringe movement to a significant political force with a broad support base. Beyond its armed struggle against Israel, Hamas functions as a complex organization that engages in policy-making and provides services such as healthcare, education, and social aid. Rather than simply opposing Fatah's secular approach, Hamas positions itself as a viable Islamic alternative. While rooted in an Islamist ideology, Hamas has gradually shifted its discourse toward a more rational, pragmatic, and nationally oriented political understanding. Its electoral success stems not from extremism but from a centrist and inclusive political stance. Without relying on a charismatic leadership figure, Hamas has managed to establish itself as a strong grassroots movement deeply embedded in Palestinian society.

Hamas also stands out as the only Islamist organization that openly opposes Israel's settler-colonial and Zionist policies in the region, making it, in Israel's view, the most threatening Islamist group. Its founding charter contains anti-Semitic language and rejects the legitimacy of the Israeli state, reinforcing this perception. However, unlike global jihadist organizations, Hamas has confined its acts of violence to the Israeli-Palestinian context, maintaining a clear and localized scope of operations. In the eyes of many Palestinians, Hamas represents a force capable of retaliating against Israeli aggression, thus serving as a symbol of deterrence. On the other hand, due to its attacks targeting Israel, Hamas is designated as a terrorist organization by many states and international institutions, including the European Union, the United Nations, and Israel. While it occasionally uses violence and terror for political purposes, Hamas is not solely defined by its military tactics. Its multidimensional character—as a political actor, a military force, and a social movement—requires a more nuanced and comprehensive evaluation beyond traditional definitions of terrorism.

It can be said that Hamas is not a monolithic entity with fixed goals and strategies. It is analytically important to distinguish between Hamas's "grassroots" activists and its military wing (Gunning, 2023). Hamas has a combination of "horizontally and vertically differentiated positions". Vertically, Hamas maintains a rigid line of command to facilitate its various functions (security, military, political, and preaching), while horizontally it relies on a network of informal relationships to maintain local support. Hamas, on the other hand, is an umbrella organization that encompasses three broad subdivisions: civil society (charities and educational institutions), political party (Al-Maktab al-Siyasi or Political Bureau), and military wing (Ezz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades). If we look at these sections one by one; a) While implementing new violent tactics, Hamas also played a role as a religious and charitable organization providing social welfare services to Palestinians, particularly those living in the Gaza Strip, using a network of social institutions, including schools, medical clinics, and food distribution networks. Hamas has used its network of social institutions, including schools, medical clinics, and food distribution networks, to build a broad power base beyond its natural ideological base (Chehab, 2007: 130). The Islamic movement has become a vital source of support for hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, filling the gap left by a lack of state-supported social services (Jensen, 2008). Such activities gave Hamas greater legitimacy among Palestinians b) Hamas established the government in Gaza by winning many seats in the elections held in the Gaza Strip in 2006. However, post-election conflicts with Israel increased with the control of Hamas. Many countries and organizations consider Hamas as a terror organization (Jensen, 2008: 141).

It is essential to underscore the significance of key political shifts that have played a seminal role in facilitating the emergence of Hamas (Gunning, 2023). Support for Hamas was based on public frustration, anger, and the organization's ability to fill the leadership void (Levitt, 2006). Arafat played a key role in the founding of the PLO in 1964 and became the organization's first president. He also took the lead on the Oslo Accords and initiated the process that led to the establishment of the Palestinian Authority. However, his leadership was criticized due to difficulties in progressing the process and disruptions in peace talks. Even though it doesn't have a charismatic leader, Hamas official institutionalization is shaped by a structure known as 'internal' and 'external' leaderships. The internal leadership operates between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with underground members in East Jerusalem and Israel. The external leadership is dispersed across the region, with many active members in refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria (Baconi, 2018: 30).

After Fatah's failure against Israel for more than 10 years, the electorate decided to vote for Hamas, which had previously proven itself in municipal elections, although it had not participated in national elections. The failure of the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority to achieve a lasting peace with Israel and the death of Arafat made it politically possible

for Hamas to participate in the parliamentary elections. Hamas had previously refused to participate in Palestinian national politics due to its rejection of the Oslo Accords and its inability to legitimize working through Oslo institutions. However, the death of Oslo and Arafat's withdrawal from the stage paved the way for Hamas's entry into national politics. Additionally, Arafat's death distanced Fatah from being a charismatic leader. Because Fatah's power stemmed from its connection with Arafat, the political symbol of Palestine, making it impossible for any other party to compete. Arafat's death and the absence of a charismatic personality in Fatah after him accelerated the institutionalization of Fatah. Charismatic centrist parties are harder to defeat because they focus on the personality of the founder. The transformation of the centrist Fatah from a charismatic party to an institutionalized party has made it possible for the already institutionalized Hamas to compete effectively with Fatah. Hamas has been an institutionalized party since its inception because it has always had a bureaucratic, routine governance process that follows official codes of conduct. Moreover, Hamas has a grassroots approach to interacting with the public. Now institutionalized Fatah and institutionalized Hamas competed on an equal footing, where they could be judged by voters on their respective performances. Hamas first tested the situation by participating in municipal elections. After proving to himself and the electorate that could do this, it participated in parliamentary elections and eventually won a majority of seats. Therefore, Hamas existed as a party that produced alternative policies and did not provide its support through the charismatic personality of its leader, that is, it was neither charismatic nor protest (Van der Brug and Mughan, 2007: 30). While not a protest or charismatic party, the organization has a strong network of social institutions based on Al-Mujada'Il-Islami (or Islamic Community) and a number of formal structures that provide educational and charitable services.

4. The Strategic Calculus of Hamas: Violence, Resistance and Power

Hamas's early armed struggle aligns with Fanon's view that "freedom is achieved through violence." Viewing Israel as a colonial power, Hamas embraced violence not just strategically but as an existential form of resistance. In this context, Fanon's theory of violence offers a useful framework for understanding how Hamas legitimizes its actions. Frantz Fanon, as a theorist of anti-colonial struggle, advocates the necessity of violence in the liberation of colonized peoples. According to him, the oppression and racist discrimination imposed by the colonizer create deep psychological trauma in the oppressed populations, and violence serves both as a form of rebellion and a means of identity formation in overcoming this trauma. Fanon sees violence not only as a tool of destruction but also as a way for the exploited to reassert themselves as human beings (Fanon, 2023). He legitimizes violence as a way to overthrow the colonizer's "inferior" status and achieve freedom. Moreover, according to Fanon, "The colonized man finds his freedom in and through violence" (1963: 86). Palestinian resistance movements, especially Fatah, have adapted Fanon's concepts of colonialism and liberation to their own struggle. In the chapter titled "On National Culture" in *The Wretched of the Earth*, Fanon (1963; 246) makes a powerful call to his people and to all colonized individuals in pursuit of the longed-for state of freedom and the new national consciousness that is to emerge alongside it. He argues that national culture should not be limited to the mere imitation and preservation of pre-colonial forms; on the contrary, he insists that this notion must be transcended, and that culture must be consciously reconstructed through resistance and struggle.

The Palestinian resistance seeks to put into practice Fanon's idea that "violence against the colonizer is legitimate" (Nakhleh, 1971). This approach also gains meaning within the framework of the Frustration-Aggression Theory. According to this theory, the blockage of an expected reward or the revocation of a previously granted right creates deep frustration, which over time can transform into anger and aggression. This situation can be concretely observed in the Palestinian case. For example, after the 1967 Six-Day War, Israel's Defense Minister Moshe Dayan initiated the "open bridges" policy, allowing Palestinians in the West Bank free passage to Israel and Jordan, significantly improving their economic situation. However, these gains were overshadowed by settlement activities, arbitrary arrests, and humiliating rhetoric from Israeli nationalists, leading to deep resentment and anger among the Palestinian people.

The unemployment rate in Gaza has reached nearly 50% (with this rate rising up to 72% among women). In this context, the hope for a dignified life among Palestinian youth is almost nonexistent outside of militancy. Therefore, the repeated rejection of economic incentives increasingly pushes Palestinians toward resistance and armed struggle. Thus, the desire to gain meaning and dignity through violence outweighs economic concerns; violence becomes the only way to give honor and meaning to life. Rather than trying to achieve peace through economic means, psychological studies reveal that the strongest hope for lasting peace lies in recognizing Palestinians' quest for meaning and dignity and developing

solutions accordingly. Otherwise, a cycle of violence will continue where the parties inflict pain on each other and each time try to compensate for their shame and humiliation through revenge. Economic development can certainly contribute—but it should never be offered as the price of dignity (Kruglanski, 2023).

Similarly, after Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, a \$1.5 billion development fund for Gaza and the West Bank was planned under the leadership of former World Bank president James Wolfensohn. However, the long-accumulated feelings of humiliation and lack of trust were so profound that the chances of success for this economic opening were minimal. In this context, Hamas's victory in the 2006 elections and its takeover of Gaza Strip control in 2007 (Kruglanski, 2023) clearly demonstrate how frustration paved the way for radicalization. At the same time, Israeli settlement activities, the arrests of Palestinians, and chauvinistic rhetoric by Israeli nationalists caused Palestinians to feel humiliated. This situation led to the First Intifada (1987–1993), which included protests and uprisings, and eventually ended the “open bridges” policy and the economic gains it brought.

Fatah leaders, referencing Fanon's thesis on anti-colonial violence, view armed struggle as a legitimate tool for Palestine's “liberation from foreign control” and the people's self-determination. Hamas, on the other hand, as more of a religious and social movement, applies Fanon's concept of liberating violence on a different ideological basis. While Hamas regards resistance against Israel as a sacred duty, it adopts Fanon's colonial/colonized binary opposition as an important reference in its political discourse. Hamas uses violence, as conceptualized by Fanon, not only as a military strategy but also as a political and social tool.

The internal conflict between Hamas and Fatah has not only been a resistance movement against Israel but also the foundation of a political and ideological struggle within Palestine. While both Hamas and Fatah agree that achieving national unity is essential for the success of resistance, they have held differing views on how to achieve it. Fatah's pragmatic faction has tended toward compromise, whereas Hamas's more radical faction remained determined to continue the struggle (Widzer, 2024). However, it is important not to overstate or see these ideological divisions and internal Palestinian political rivalries as the sole cause of everything. Indeed, there are studies that highlight the October 7 attack primarily as a significant move within the internal Palestinian power struggle rather than solely a response to Israel's oppressive and settler-state policies (Widzer, 2024).

Hamas's transformation from a ‘resistance movement’ into a ‘governing authority’ was solidified when it seized control of the Gaza Strip in 2007 and consolidated its power. Hamas's style of governance does not fully represent either an Islamic or a democratic model. Instead, Hamas has adopted a pragmatic form of governance shaped by ideological and strategic flexibility. Rather than following a strict ideological program, Hamas takes various strategic steps to consolidate its power and eliminate internal rivals. In this context, the ideological dimension of Hamas has been somewhat sidelined, and a flexible governance style has been developed in line with political and military objectives. Hamas's stance toward Salafi-Jihadist groups in Gaza further reinforces this pragmatic approach. By adopting a tough position against these groups, Hamas aims to maintain its dominance both ideologically and strategically (Brenner, 2017).

Hamas's governance experience in Gaza has gone beyond political and military strategies to also affect and shape social structures. The challenges Hamas faces are not only related to the practicalities of governing an occupied territory but also concern social norms and traditions. The hybrid governance model pursued by Hamas combines modern state administration with traditional social structures. This indicates that Hamas has evolved beyond a mere military organization into a form of governance that takes local social order and cultural norms into account. Utilizing informal mechanisms such as traditional family councils, religious leaders, and prominent local figures serves Hamas's efforts to control local society and secure legitimacy. This approach strengthens its ties with the public while also reinforcing social structures. The integration of local traditions and norms in Gaza with Hamas's formal governance processes has been a strategic step to solidify the organization's acceptance among the people. It shows that while managing a strong social fabric in Gaza, Hamas respects the traditional values of the local population and relies on them to maintain social order.

Another important point emphasized by Brenner is that Hamas's use of informal mechanisms to maintain social order is a situation unique to Gaza. This reflects Hamas's ability to achieve social consensus not only through military and political strategies but also by developing a mode of governance that aligns with the local social structures in the region. By utilizing traditional social frameworks and societal norms to reinforce its authority and legitimacy in Gaza, Hamas transforms itself from merely a military actor into a significant component of the region's social fabric (Brenner, 2017). Thus, Hamas possesses a unique dynamism in adapting to changing political and military conditions. This is evident in

its flexible leadership structure and its capacity to respond swiftly to both internal and external pressures. Despite its strong ideological foundation, Hamas has continued to remain a major force in both the Palestinian and broader regional context by demonstrating remarkable adaptability in its tactics and strategies (Amr, 2024; Brenner, 2017).

Baconi shows that Hamas has offered pragmatic concessions regarding the three conditions imposed by the international community: renouncing violence, recognizing Israel, and accepting past agreements. Although Hamas has made these pragmatic concessions, Baconi emphasizes that Israel and the United States responded negatively to these steps. This is seen as an Israeli policy aimed at limiting and neutralizing Hamas. Baconi argues that Israel does not accept Hamas as a negotiating partner; instead, it weakens the group to ensure that no meaningful path to a solution is found. In other words, Israel's outright refusal to negotiate with Hamas results in the long term in an inability to produce a lasting solution with the Palestinians. Despite all this, Hamas is still labeled as an anti-system organization because it is a militant resistance group.

The term "anti-system" has generally been used to refer to parties that aim to destroy the system in which they exist. An anti-system party will have a "polarizing" effect on the system due to its ideological distance. However, Hamas fits neither the "ideological" nor the "relational" definition of anti-systemism. Hamas is not an ideologically anti-system party because its ideology is not a threat to Palestinian democratic institutions. The fact that Hamas has a hostile relationship with Israel does not make it an anti-systemic organization, because its anti-systemism is determined by threats to domestic political institutions, not by its foreign policies towards its enemies (Haboub, 2012: 70-71). Therefore, Hamas does not fit the definition of an extreme party, nor does it fit the definition of anti-system. If an organization demands independence and sovereignty over its own lands, this is part of its ideology and should not always be regarded as "anti-system." Many movements and organizations similarly exist based on demands for independence and sovereignty.

Anti-system external state actors openly or covertly exploit the resistance potential in civil war environments to increase their strategic influence. Similarly, as seen in the conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Ukraine, Yemen, Afghanistan, Somalia, Mali, and Libya, both internal and external non-state actors take advantage of political instability caused by interstate conflicts or failed states. External non-state actors such as ISIS, Al-Nusra, and Hezbollah also play significant roles in these conflicts. However, unlike classic non-state actors, Hamas exercises de facto governance in Gaza and functions as a quasi-state actor with political, military, and administrative structures. While groups like ISIS and Al-Nusra lack centralized governance, Hamas controls a specific territory and provides public services. Supported by countries such as Iran, Qatar, and Türkiye, Hamas plays an influential role in regional balances and employs hybrid strategies in its ongoing conflicts with Israel. Although the practice of states using resistance groups as strategic tools partially applies to Hamas, its organizational structure and political existence distinguish it from other non-state actors (Lee, 2017).

In addition to the radical change that Arafat's death created in the Palestinian political arena, there were multiple reasons for Hamas' decision to participate in the electoral and political process. The failure of the peace process between Israel and the PLO and the failure of the PLO to achieve its national goal of a viable Palestinian state was a major factor in Hamas's emergence into a significant military force that could threaten the power of the Palestinian Authority. In particular, the failure of the peace process was a major factor in the spiral of violence that increased the power and spread of militant groups opposing the Palestinian Authority. Hamas's military strengthening in order to increase its resistance to the Israeli occupation and its participation in the violent uprising by increasing its political influence in the Palestinian streets positively increased its image in the popular consciousness. Hamas' decision to participate in Palestinian national elections was spurred after Hamas' success in the first round of municipal elections in 2004. The political victory of the organization also strengthened its image in the Palestinian mentality, and the political weight of the movement increased day by day (Natil, 2015). But, the tension and division between Fatah and Hamas remains one of the biggest obstacles to Palestinian politics and society.

As can be seen, the basis of Hamas's emergence on the political stage stems from the institutional weakness of the Palestinian government, internal polarization and its inability to face an effective opposition. If there was a credible secular alternative, most Palestinians would support it (Levitt, 2006). Palestinian society has suffered greatly from Hamas' conflicts with Israel and has not been able to carry out an effective negotiation process. The extent of today's conflicts also shows that even if there is effective negotiation, it will not be able to extinguish the fire of permanent hostilities and prejudices. In particular, Israel's aggressive actions for more than a hundred days and the humanitarian

tragedy it has created have irreversible consequences. It is worrying where these results will take humanity. Many crimes and terrorist acts that cannot be covered up, such as the use of various and dangerous weapons such as white phosphorus, bomb attacks on hospitals and schools, the killing of journalists defending the right to the press, and attempts to cover it up on the grounds that it is a mistake, are carried out by Israel in a frenzy.

5. Hamas and Suicide Attacks

Why does Hamas view suicide attacks as a viable option? Research based on various sources, including 88 interviews with senior leaders of six Palestinian political organizations and close relatives and friends of Palestinian suicide bombers conducted in 2006, suggests that the primary reason for the use of suicide bombing is severe state repression (Araj, 2008). In states like Israel, where many targets are heavily fortified, reaching a target, attacking it, and safely returning without capture can be exceedingly difficult. In such cases, suicide bombing often becomes a tactical necessity. Furthermore, when facing a well-armed and organized enemy, a terrorist organization may become inclined to seek new tactics. If the targeted state employs heavily armed and protected military forces rather than police in counterterrorism efforts, suicide tactics may become more advantageous for terrorist organizations, serving as a “national liberation strategy” (Nilsson, 2018: 104). Thus, the repression applied by Israel during the Second Intifada (2000-2005) contributed to the increase in Palestinian suicide attacks (Araj, 2008: 285). It is important to note that the severe state repression seen in conflicts involving suicide bombing is both a cause and an effect of such tactics (Araj, 2008). Therefore, severe state repression often perpetuates a cycle of violence.

Following the Oslo Accords, the PLO's emergence as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people was perceived as a threat by rival groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. In response, both organizations escalated their violent actions against Israel, realizing the strategic impact of suicide attacks. These assaults positioned Israel as a victim of terrorism in the eyes of the international community. Israel, in turn, capitalized on this victimhood narrative to justify the implementation of harsher security measures and collective punishment policies. These actions intensified pressure on the Palestinian population, leading to increased radicalization and diminishing the appeal of peaceful coexistence with the Israeli state. Simultaneously, widespread corruption and ineffective governance within the Palestinian Authority further deepened public frustration and hopelessness (Gupta and Mundra, 2005).

Actually, Hamas's use of suicide attacks can be seen as a “reversal” strategy, where individuals act against their beliefs or norms. In Islam, suicide is generally condemned, but for groups like Hamas, suicide attacks are justified through the concept of martyrdom, which promises spiritual rewards. This exploitation of religious concepts is used to advance their extremist goals (Hutchins, 2017: 7). However, such attacks are not always religion-based. For example, the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) in Sri Lanka used suicide attacks for political and nationalist objectives, selecting attackers based on the group's goals rather than religious identity (Hutchins, 2017: 7; Palaver, 2013). Similarly, many non-Muslim groups use suicide attackers for various political, ethnic, or ideological reasons. Moreover, in the early 2000s, Hamas frequently employed suicide attacks as an effective tactical tool. However, after 2006, such operations significantly declined and were largely replaced by more conventional methods of combat and a resistance strategy based on organized military structures. Therefore, as of today, Hamas's inclination to use this tactic has reversed, and suicide attacks no longer constitute a primary instrument in the organization's repertoire of struggle (Sarvananthan, 2018).

The move of “reversal” is not only executed by Hamas; Israel, as seen today, is also accused of committing acts similar to Nazi crimes in Gaza and its surroundings. Once a symbol of the salvation of a wounded and oppressed people, the Jewish state is now accused of practicing apartheid, genocide, and ethnic cleansing (Divine, 2019: 1). When a society that has suffered genocide becomes a perpetrator of genocide itself, particularly against a persecuted and justified people, it is an example of dehumanization and moral rupture. The Jewish people have endured one of the most profound and tragic forms of victimization in European history. However, during the establishment of the State of Israel, the burden of this historical crime was placed upon the Palestinians, turning them into the “second victims” of this traumatic past. In other words, a people who were historically oppressed have, in turn, oppressed another. For this reason, as Edward Said aptly puts it, the Palestinians are the “victims of the victims” (Said, 1995).

On the other hand, assassination is seen not only as a tactical operation carried out by Israeli forces but also as a strategic move aimed at destabilizing Hamas internally and weakening its regional alliances, including efforts toward Palestinian reconciliation (Amr, 2024). However, the Palestinian resistance has historically proven that it does not weaken with the death of its leaders; on the contrary, it grows stronger. From Hamas's perspective, the historical experience gained

through the assassination of its leaders has only strengthened the movement. Israel is aware of this. In March 2004, Israel killed Hamas's founder and spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in a missile strike; a month later, his successor Abdel Aziz Rantisi was killed in the same manner. These deaths did not weaken Hamas; rather, the organization became more radical (Abusada, 2024). A younger and more defiant leadership took control of the organization and engaged in multiple clashes with Israel starting from 2008, a process that culminated in the October 7 attacks. The deaths of leaders such as Ibrahim al-Maqadmeh, Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, and Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi, as well as the killing of Ismail Haniyeh during the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, added distinct motivation to the organization (Al-Rantisi, 2024). Although the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh and subsequently the killing of Hamas's new leader Yahya Sinwar weakened Hamas at the leadership level, it did not ideologically weaken Hamas as a movement or idea. Considering the security situation before Sinwar's death, he had appointed an external leadership council under the chairmanship of Hamas's Shura Council and composed of the movement's regional sector leaders. This council was tasked with managing the movement's affairs, maintaining relations, and making necessary decisions. So far, this council has filled the leadership vacuum within Hamas, and the movement continues to conduct significant negotiations with other states through this council, making important decisions there (Al-Rantisi, 2024; Amr, 2024).

The footage of Sinwar attempting to shoot down an Israeli drone with a stick reinforced his ideological legacy, turning him into almost a legendary figure in the eyes of many of his supporters. By 2025, Hamas adopted a complex and multi-layered leadership model known as "collective leadership." This structure not only provided the organization with greater flexibility but also created a more resilient foundation against intelligence-based targeted attacks. Collective leadership also functions as a survival strategy for Hamas. As a result, Israel's tactic of "neutralizing leaders" has become less effective against the organization (Abusada, 2024).

Moreover, Israel has always approached its relationship with Hamas primarily through a military and security lens, showing little effort to pursue a moderate political approach. For instance, in January 2025, a ceasefire was brokered with the mediation of the United States, Egypt, and Qatar, but this ceasefire ended on March 18, 2025, following a surprise Israeli attack on Gaza that resulted in the deaths of over 500 people. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu stated that the war would not end until Hamas was completely destroyed. Hamas, meanwhile, demands the release of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli jails and a permanent ceasefire in exchange for freeing hostages in its possession (Al-Mughrabi, 2025).

Finally, after two years of war, a ceasefire in Gaza came into effect on October 9, 2025, through an agreement reached between Israel and Hamas. This ceasefire is considered the first phase of Donald Trump's Middle East peace plan and was implemented with the mediation of Qatar, Egypt, and the United States. While it has succeeded in halting hostilities in the short term and contributed to improving the humanitarian situation, uncertainties remain in critical areas such as security, reconstruction, and independent international monitoring (Hayman and Guterman, 2025). But all mediation and ceasefire efforts carried out in Gaza and Israel, whether led by international or regional actors, often aim solely to halt the conflict, yet they can inadvertently serve to revive resistance cultures and collective memory. Indeed, no agreement reached at the negotiating table can fully address the collective memory and selective traumas experienced on the ground.

6. Conclusion

The main argument of the study is that when the moral and legal boundaries between resistance and terrorism become blurred—considering the methods used and the target audience—the legitimacy of a just resistance risks transforming into terrorism. The instability of moral foundations and the ambiguity of the line between terrorism and resistance support this argument, as countries may adopt definitions that serve their own interests. Additionally, since resistance by nature involves rebellion and defiance, it tends toward violence. Given that a just resistance can turn into acts of terrorism and become morally indefensible, the study advocates for sharper and more objective international norms, sanctions, and definitions as a series of proposed solutions.

Resistance is a multidimensional phenomenon that is not limited to overt political actions, uprisings, or wars; it can also manifest in the practices, symbols, and social relations of everyday life. These non-violent forms of resistance gain legitimacy through social solidarity, identity formation, and the preservation of cultural continuity, functioning as passive or symbolic acts of opposition against dominant cultural and power structures. In this sense, resistance represents a society's existential reflex of self-defense. Terrorism, on the other hand, fundamentally differs from

resistance: it turns violence from a means into an end, targets civilians, and seeks to achieve political objectives through fear, coercion, and chaos. While resistance derives its legitimacy from popular support, collective identity, and the pursuit of liberation, terrorism departs from these foundations by placing violence at the center of its ideological framework. Thus, resistance embodies a protective and existential struggle, whereas terrorism assumes a destructive and illegitimate character. The example of Hamas clearly illustrates this distinction. The organization's activities in education, the establishment of social assistance networks, and the use of religious symbols to strengthen collective consciousness represent non-violent yet politically powerful forms of resistance (Nordstrom, 1992).

Hamas, as the local and dynamic branch of the institutionalized Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine, has evolved in line with the internal and external developments of the organization, and with its resistance-oriented mindset aimed at achieving its goals rapidly, it has come to be regarded as a revisionist group. In fact, this organization was a radical choice born out of disappointment, anger, and despair. Compared to terrorist organizations, Hamas does not possess extremist or anti-systemic characteristics in its ideology and rise, maintains its resistance through democratic means, and occasionally opposes Israel's harsh state with its actions. Therefore, it was inevitable for Israel to present it as a security threat. While implementing its policies towards Palestine, Israel portrays Hamas to the world as an extremist, unethical, anti-system, and radical terrorist organization, which facilitated its operations. However, Hamas does not fit these definitions; rather, it is a resistance organization that can exploit the system's vulnerabilities and achieve this through soft power policies. Hamas's primary founding motivation is not to kill in the name of jihad but to respond to injustice by resisting it. Despite all its unacceptable crimes against humanity, Israel makes a tremendous effort to target Hamas and allows disinformation that serves this purpose. Unfortunately, mutual defamatory discourses and campaigns draw uncertain paths for the future of the parties and create stereotyped discourses and beliefs.

Hamas's political transformation deserves further study because it has become an indispensable actor in Palestinian politics and the Israel-Palestine conflict. The findings show that Hamas is not a fanatic terrorist organization or a wholly destructive element; rather, it is a complex social movement that can be considered a pragmatic organization in terms of its structure and actions (Lugo, 2011). In existing literature, Hamas is generally either defined as a marginal organization and overlooked or accepted as a terrorist organization. However, when examined within its historical background and social roots, it clearly emerges that this resistance movement differs from other terrorist or marginal organizations in many respects. Although Hamas's vision includes a militant stance against Israel, it fully defines itself as a social movement. Considering both the multilayered nature of complex power structures like Hamas and the secretive, diversified, and constantly evolving character of resistance is vital for the theoretical and empirical advancement of resistance studies. This approach creates a solid and comprehensive foundation for studying resistance in social sciences more deeply and multidimensionally.

The idea of "reforming the Muslim community according to true Islam" is not Hamas's primary motivation but rather the main tool used to legitimize its actions. In any case, if we claim that Islam and Islamic goals completely dominate Hamas's policies, we would struggle to explain the support Hamas receives from Palestinian Christians. Therefore, it must be said that Hamas is deeply rooted in Palestinian society regardless of differences such as religion, nationality, ethnicity, or gender. Additionally, Hamas has managed to overcome social divisions and class distinctions, maintaining its presence in all spheres of life (Temel, 2019).

Hamas's armed struggle, particularly during its formative years and the early 2000s, can be interpreted through a Fanonian lens. Hamas has perceived Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories not merely as a military threat but as a form of colonial domination. This perspective has led the organization to adopt violence not only as a strategic tool but also as an ideological and existential instrument. The suicide attacks and various forms of armed resistance employed by Hamas resonate with Fanon's assertion that "freedom can only be achieved through violence." Such acts can be interpreted as expressions of the colonized Palestinian subject asserting its existence and striving to create a new political space by directly confronting the colonial master. In this regard, Fanon's theory of violence provides a powerful analytical framework for understanding how actors like Hamas justify the use of violence and conceptualize it as a strategy of liberation.

Fanon's theory of liberatory violence holds a central place in the political and ideological discourses of Palestinian resistance movements. Both Fatah and Hamas employ this theory to justify their legitimate resistance against the Israeli occupation. Hamas charts its path toward liberating Palestinian society and defending the interests of Palestinian

citizens by adopting a militant stance against Israel while simultaneously providing social assistance, education, and health services. To better understand Hamas's roots and formation, a detailed analysis of Palestine's social dynamics, historical and political background, and the actors that have emerged over time in these lands is necessary. Otherwise, without considering internal variables, the Palestine conflict will continue to be viewed solely as an international issue and Hamas merely as a terrorist organization (Temel, 2019). Moreover, from Frantz Fanon's perspective, Israel operates as a settler-colonial entity that enforces colonial violence and acts as an outpost of Western imperialism in the Middle East. According to Fanon, colonial violence is not only physical but also psychological, cultural, and structural; in this context, Israel's practices such as military blockade, settlement policies, identity checks, walls, and legal discrimination can be seen as manifestations of colonial violence. Prominent scholars such as Edward Said, Ilan Pappé, and Judith Butler, who uphold and extend Fanon's perspectives, emphasize the structural violence and settler colonialism experienced by the Palestinian people, arguing that even when resistance involves violence, it constitutes a necessary response and a pursuit of justice against the oppressive colonial power; this understanding forms the central analytical framework of this article. Ultimately, the root cause of Hamas's turn to violence lies in the structural pressures and conditions of the occupation it faces; therefore, Hamas's activities should be understood not as terrorism, but as an existential and legitimate form of resistance.

Ethical Declaration

It is declared that scientific and ethical principles were adhered to during the execution and writing of this study, and that all sources used have been appropriately cited.

Declaration Regarding the Use of Artificial Intelligence

The authors commit to adhering to ethical principles, transparency, and responsibility in the use of artificial intelligence tools, ensuring their academic responsibility.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

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